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ABSTRACT
POST HOC INDOOR LOCALIZATION BASED ON RSS
FINGERPRINT IN WLAN
FEBRUARY 2014
HAO HUANG
B.E., CHONGQING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
CHONGQING, CHINA
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Dennis L. Goeckel
In the investigation of crimes committed by wireless users, one of the key goals is
to determine the location of the mobile device at the time of the crime. Since this
happens during the investigative phase after the crime is committed, we term this
the post hoc geographical localization estimation problem. In this thesis, we introduce
the post hoc geographical localization estimation problem and present approaches for
its solution based on radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting. Motivated by the goal of
establishing a crime’s location with enough accuracy to obtain a search warrant, our
focus is on locating a criminal mobile device in indoor environments with roughly
the granularity to distiguish between two adjacent rooms, without having the ability
to enter those rooms or the building to gather input data for the RF fingerprinting
algorithm. While empirical performance studies of instantaneous indoor positioning
vi
systems based radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting have been presented in the lit-
erature, the core of this thesis is the first empirical study focused on the post hoc
version of problem from the viewpoint of digital forensics. In this study, we set up
experiments in a residential area and collect a large set of raw data in order to ana-
lyze and evaluate the algorithms, the best of which provides a mean error distance of
roughly 1.4 meters. In addition, we consider enhancements to the baseline algorithms
if knowledge of the blueprint of the building is available. In particular, we consider
whether compensating the raw data for the attenuation caused by walls can improve
algorithm performance.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The success of wireless networks and the ubiquitous usage of mobile devices have
revolutionized certain types of cybercrime. According to a Norton Cybercrime Report
[12], email account hacking, responded phishing attempt, identity theft and online
credit card fraud are the four main types of cybercrime globally and domestically.
And these crimes can be conducted anonymously by malicious hackers who exploit
open wireless access points. In fact, identity theft is one of the fastest growing crimes
in the United States and made up nineteen percent [1] of all fraud complaints in
2010. And there are nearly 12 million people affected by identity fraud each year [33].
One version exploits wireless access points through a technique known as Wardriving
[4]. In this scenario, a hacker tries to establish a wireless connection through a non-
protected access point into a personal or an organization’s internal network and steal
the confidential information. Afterwards, an investigative process will be triggered
by law enforcement, and it is important that there is preliminary evidence to support
a warrant providing further search rights.
As an exemplary scenario that we will use throughout this chapter to describe
the method by which we pursue the goal, consider an attack that occurs in a hotel.
A hacker could stay inside a hotel room and anonymously use the Internet through
the motel’s free Wi-Fi network. Malicious activities could take place like stealing
a consumer’s credit card, banking and other confidential business information. In
2008, at the luxury Thompson Hotel chain, a hacker captured personal and sensitive
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emails sent by guests and staff members over its network and threatened to make
them public [2].
Fortunately, the use of mobile devices by such an offender will typically result in
digital evidence. Digital forensics is the study of techniques that allow the authorized
investigation of an alleged crime or policy violation that involves digital data. One of
the key goals in investigations of crimes committed by wireless users is determining
the location of the mobile device at the time of the crime. As a prototypical example,
consider a search warrant that might require locating a mobile device with fine enough
granularity to distinguish between two adjacent rooms. We will term this post hoc
geographical localization.
Assume that each access point (AP) stores the received signal strength (RSS)
for every observable user and that the crime’s RF fingerprint, which we define as
the collection of RSS measurements across the APs for a given device at a given
time, is then available to the investigator. Per above, the investigator’s goal is to
use this RF fingerprint to determine the location of the device at the time of the
crime without having the ability to enter the building. The approach employed here
is to build a radio frequency map after the fact. In particular, in this post hoc
localization problem, we will place reference points around the building of interest
where the crime occurred and gather the collection of RSS measurements across the
APs (the RF fingerprint) for each reference point. Using this, we can then build a
radio map that relates the RF fingerprints to position. The challenge is then to use
such a radio map to determine the location of a device within the building, where
we are unable to gather data, by considering the relation between the RF fingerprint
from the crime and those collected from the reference points. Although this post
hoc localization problem has been rarely considered in the past, previous efforts on
studying instantaneous geographical localization can be used as a starting point.
2
1.2 Background
Per above, there has been extensive consideration at the localization of a wireless
device at the current time to support location-based services (LBS) for both outdoor
case and indoor scenarios. In the former case, global positioning system (GPS) [11]
and cellular networks [27] have been widely exploited. GPS provides accurate results
but consumes the battery power at a rapid rate, and does not return the location
as quickly as the user wants. On the other hand, determining a user’s location by
employing cell towers can provide a fast response result but less accuracy. For the
indoor case, several types of wireless technologies are used and can be categorized into
GPS-based, RFID-based [18], cellular-based, UWB-based [17], WLAN-based [5, 17,
20, 30] and others. Tradeoffs have been considered according to different performance
metrics, such as cost, complexity, robustness, scalability and security. Of these, the
class of WLAN-based systems takes advantage of the ubiquitous coverage of wireless
network infrastructure to estimate the mobile devices location by finding the subtle
dependency between detected electromagnetic measurements and the user’s location.
Hence it has gained a lot of attention for indoor applications.
A widely adopted approach in WLAN indoor localization is fingerprint positioning
[5, 20, 24, 31]. Fingerprint is a vector of received signal strength (RSS) measurements
collected from detectable access points (APs). During an offline stage, fingerprints
are collected at pre-determined positions, called reference points (RPs), to build a
pre-mapping database or a table of RSS patterns around the area of interest [5, 10]
(see Biaz and Ji for a survey of techniques [6]). This pre-mapping database is called
a radio map [31], and it contains the coordinate location of the reference point and
the related vector of RSS measurements. During the online stage, the mobile device
moves into the area of interest and a set of sample measured RSS values can be
collected from detectable APs and stored in the device itself. Then its location is
estimated by calculating the similarity between the sample measurements and the
3
entries in the offline radio map. The computation can be done by the mobile device
itself or by a remote server. The final step is to map the similarity to the coordinate
location. The most challenging side of fingerprint based positioning is the design of
an algorithm that measures the similarity between the online measurement and an
entry in the database. Two algorithms from the literature will be reviewed in Chapter
2 and implemented in later experiments.
1.3 Problem Statement and Definitions
Traditionally, the aforementioned techniques and the consideration of performance
tradeoffs are limited to the instantaneous indoor positioning problem, where a radio
map is constructed in advance (i.e. before the target device gets into the area of
interest). In this case there are two common drawbacks: (i) pre-mapping can be
prohibitive for large geographical areas and private residences, and (ii) changes to the
environment can render pre-mapped data inaccurate. Furthermore, many proposals
rely on a regular grid, but it is unlikely that a regular grid will be available in a
residential area where a crime might take place.
In this thesis, we are interested in locating mobile device from the forensics view-
point. When the criminal commits the crime, the access points store the received
signal strength for the criminal user. Now, an investigation is initiated, and it be-
comes important for search warrant purposes to distinguish between two rooms. In
this forensics situation, the crime mobile device was used inside a building and we
assume that we have no prior knowledge about the area of interest (such as the layout
of the building). In order to estimate its position, we will proceed as follows by using
the vector of signal strength measurements recorded from the access points.
• Access the vector fingerprint of observations of the signal strength of the crim-
inal mobile device at the time of the crime.
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• Dynamically and flexibly set reference points (RPs) around the area of interest,
noting RPs cannot always be in optimal positions (e.g. only outside a private
residence).
• At each reference point, a vector fingerprint of received signal strength is col-
lected from the detectable APs.
• Each tuple containing the coordinate position of the RP and its associated
fingerprint is used to build a radio map as a description of the RSS environment
for the area of interest.
• A RSS-position dependency model will be employed to probabilistically map the
vector fingerprint of RSS measurements of the criminal mobile as an estimated
location.
There are five main assumptions that limit the scope of this work: (i) the obser-
vations of RSS stored in the criminal mobile device or at the access points at the time
of the crime are accessible, (ii) there are enough access points in the area of interest,
(iii) the target and the access points are located on the same geographic plate, (iv)
the detectable access points are the same in terms of hardware, and (v) the mobile
device is stationary.
However, this approach has three powerful advantages: (i) there is no requirement
for real-time response; (ii) the measurement can be refined after observations take
place. That is, forensics requires a reverse process for localization: observations (of a
radio related to a crime) are taken in situ by a nearby, in-place wireless mesh or AP
network, but mapping and localization occurs afterwards; (iii) we do not expect that
in-place APs are ideally placed, but we do expect the ability to ideally choose new
measurements to refine localization afterwards.
5
1.4 Approaches and Contribution
This thesis is centered around an experimental study of a post hoc fingerprint
based indoor positioning system. First, we review the wireless-based positioning sys-
tems that provides for location-based services (LBS). Next, two types of RSS-position
dependency models are considered in detail. In order to achieve a highly accurate
estimation result, we adopt the Gaussian-based kernel model, first introduced for the
instantaneous indoor localization problem, into the post hoc indoor localization prob-
lem. Next, we consider how to improves its performance. In particular, according to
studies of indoor WLAN signal characteristics, the attenuation of signal strength is
mainly due to obstacles like walls. More importantly, such obstacles significantly alter
the RF fingerprint of devices located within and make positioning challenging, since
it is such obstacles that break the dependence between signal strength and distance
from the transmitter. Thus, in situations where we have an accurate blueprint of the
structure, we consider incorporating a wall attenuation factor to compensate for the
RSS attenuation caused by the building infrastructure. To support the incorporation
of such a factor, we also present a method to find the average wall attenuation factor
for the area of interest and evaluate it through experiment.
Our experiments are set up in a residential area. A large set of raw data is collected
and analyzed in order to evaluate the algorithms presented in this work. First, we
extensively analyze the location fingerprints, which helps develop an understanding
of the signal’s underlying features and the reasons why it can be used as an indication
of location information. In particular, the distribution and the coverage of the RSS
in the indoor environment are visualized.
Next, the critical topic of AP selection is considered. To ensure the success of
an indoor positioning system based on location fingerprints, APs must be selected
that can be used to distinguish different positions without introducing significant
noise into the algorithm. Some APs can appear intermittently, which also makes
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their employment challenging. In addition, constructing a RF fingerprint radio map
requires a large amount of data from multiple APs; thus, subsets of detectable APs
may report correlated measurements, leading to needless redundancy and possible
biased estimation. This motivates the need to employ sophisticated algorithms (sucha
as multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) [26]) to choose a subset of the detectable
APs for use in positioning.
Currently, there are no clear guidelines on how to estimate the mobile device’s
position in the post hoc situation. Moreover, it is not clear how many reference
points need to be set up to build the radio map for a given accuracy. The main goal
is to study the accuracy and the precision performance metrics to identify a set of
system parameters based on practical experiments for further guidance. The result
of the system analysis can be applied to further study in post hoc indoor positioning
problem, such as considering the influence of the area of interest’s 3-D layout and the
computational cost of algorithms chosen for locating mobile devices. The following is
the list of contributions:
• A comparison of the current popular RSS-position dependency models theoret-
ically and experimentally.
• Introduction of the study of the wall attenuation factor (WAF)s influence on
indoor localization and tried to compensate its impact on current estimation
algorithms.
• Guideline for future post hoc indoor localization studies and a discussion of a
few technical challenges in this scenario.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents rele-
vant background materials and provides an outline of existing methods applied in
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a WLAN indoor instantaneous positioning system. Fingerprinting-based methods,
such as the K-nearest neighbor technique and the Gaussian kernel based technique,
are discussed and compared. Chapter 2 also presents AP selection methods used in
this thesis. Chapter 3 motivates the WAF compensation and explores its adaptation
to Gaussian kernel based methods in the post hoc problem. Chapter 4 provides a
detailed description of this experimental setup, data sets, and testing scenarios used
in evaluation. This chapter also describes the way to calculate the WAF and shows
the result comparison based on different parameters chosen, such as kernel width,
multiple discriminant analysis thresholds and the number of neighbors in KNN.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter, prior work and the necessary background for the tools employed
in our post hoc localization algorithms and experiments are presented. Per Chapter
1, there has been extensive work in the determination of the current location of a
user to support location based services (LBS). Since this is the closest application
to our problem, these prior algorithms are discussed in detail in Section 2.1. Next,
we turn to the description of the mathematical tools that will form key parts of our
algorithms. First, an important aspect of the model is the mapping of the location
to the set of received signal strengths (RSSs). Two methods for performing this
mapping are presented, namely the radio propagation model and the fingerprint-based
model. Next, we discuss two fingerprinting methods for determining a user’s location,
namely K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and Kernel-based, in Section 2.3.1 and Section
2.3.2, respectively. Finally, the underpinnings of multiple discriminant analysis, an
additional technique that will be employed to improve the estimation performance,
are described.
2.1 Wireless-based Positioning System Review
Wireless-based positioning systems are designed to provide accurate and reliable
user location information in LBS applications.
2.1.1 GPS-Based And Cellular-Based
A well-known positioning system for the outdoor environment is the Global Po-
sitioning System (GPS). Unfortunately, GPS works poorly in many cities where tall
9
buildings form urban canyons to block a clear view of the GPS satellites [11]. Also
GPS offers limited accuracy and coverage in indoor environments. There are several
positioning systems build on GPS to overcome the drawbacks of conventional GPS
[21]. For instance, assisted-GPS (AGPS) provides a GPS-based indoor technique
with an average of 15 meters accuracy. It uses a location server with a reference
GPS receiver that can detect the same satellites to help another GPS to find a weak
GPS signal. Another approach exploits the mobile cellular network and is applied
where the area of interest is covered by several base stations or one base station
with a strong RSS received by the indoor mobile target. An example [27] of such
implements the indoor localization on GSM mobile phones through the use of “wide”
signal-strength fingerprints, where a wide fingerprint includes the six strongest GSM
cells and readings of up to 29 additional GSM channels. The results in [27] show
that the GSM-based indoor localization system can differentiate between floors and
achieve median errors of around 4 to 5 meters. Although these methods can provide
reasonable indoor position estimation, the extra requirement for cellular network in-
frastructure and the limited application on mobile phones make them not suitable for
reliable and efficient LBS.
2.1.2 RFID-Based And UWB-Based
Besides the GPS and the cellular network solutions, different types of wireless tech-
nologies such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) and ultra-wideband (UWB) are
employed. RFID is a means of storing and retrieving data through electromagnetic
transmission to an RF compatible integrated circuit and a RFID system consists of
a number of RFID readers, RFID tags and the communication between them. The
reader is used to read the data from the tags. The tags can be categorized as either
passive or active. Passive RFID tags receive the RF signal from a reader and add
location information by the reflected signal. Active RFID tags act as transceivers,
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which could actively transmit location information. For the positioning purpose, ac-
tive RFID is generally more suitable because it has a smaller antenna and a much
longer working range. SpotON [18] is a well-known location sensing system that
uses an aggregation algorithm for 3-D location sensing based on radio signal strength
analysis from many tags. Another application is called LANDMARC (indoor location
sensing using active RFID) which uses extra fixed location reference tags to help lo-
cation calibration and adopts the KNN method to calculate the location of the RFID
tags.
Unlike conventional RFID systems, UWB is based on sending ultrashort pulses
with a low duty cycle, and it utilizes a wide swath of the radio spectrum to transmit
a signal for a much shorter duration. Some field experiments have been introduced
in [17] where the Ubisense system is considered. It is a unidirectional UWB location
platform with a conventional bidirectional time division multiple access control chan-
nel. It works by creating sensor cells throughout buildings or collections of buildings,
with each cell including at least 4 sensors or readers. The readers receive location
data from tags and send it to the Ubisense Smart Space software platform. Although
these systems are able to localize users with reasonable accuracies, they require the
installation of additional sensors, which are subjected to large-scale deployments.
2.1.3 WLAN-Based
Due to the widespread adoption of 802.11x wireless LAN as a common network in-
frastructure, Wi-Fi-based localization techniques have been explored in order to con-
vert the detected electromagnetic signals into a measureable metric such as distance
and angle for location determination [16]. For instance, [7] applied the Motley-Keenan
propagation model, which is convenient to estimate the distance between neighboring
sensors from received signal strength (RSS) measurements. Another type of measure-
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ment is a propagation time measurement, such as time-difference-of-arrival (TDOA)
and time of arrival (TOA).
The TOA or TDOA related methods rely on estimating the propagation time of
signals between a transmitter and multiple receivers, such as one-way propagation
time measurements and round-trip propagation time measurements. The one-way
propagation measurements determine the time difference between the time the sig-
nal is sent from transmitter and the signal is received. The round-trip measurement
finds the difference between the time the signal is sent from a sensor and the time of
receiving the returned signal at the same sensor. Once TOA or TDOA measurements
are collected, the distance between two sensors can be approximately calculated by
considering the speed of signal propagation (i.e. the speed of light). Then there is a
geometrical circle centered on each receiver with an estimated distance between trans-
mitter and receiver. In the ideal case, propagation measurements at three receivers
would define an intersection point of the circles as where the transmitter locates.
Then based on the coordinates of the three receivers, the coordinates of the trans-
mitter could be calculated. However, in order to get a satisfying position estimation,
both approaches require perfect time synchronization, which would add cost to sensors
by demanding highly accurate clocks or a sophisticated synchronization mechanism.
Also, they are hampered by multipath propagation, non-line-of-sight (NLOS) signal
paths, and other impairments.
RSS-based fingerprint positioning, [5, 20, 30], is the most widely used technique
in the literature. This technique consists in having an RSS radio map that can be
used to characterize the Wi-Fi radio coverage at different positions and then finding a
target’s position by comparing the target’s RSS sample measurements with the radio
map.
A traditional algorithm used to estimate the location computes the Euclidean
distance between the vector of signal strength estimations of the mobile and each of
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those for each entry in the radio map. The coordinates associated with the fingerprint
that has the smallest distance are regarded as the estimate of the position. RADAR
[5] is an in-building user location and tracking system, which uses a KNN method in
order to find the closest match between the observed RSS vector and those in the radio
map. The author in [5] also considered the signal propagation model and added the
wall attenuation factor (WAF) and floor attenuation factor into account. The Horus
system [31] adopts a joint clustering technique and probabilistic method for location
estimation. Each reference coordinate is regarded as a class, and a location is chosen
when its likelihood is highest and the error distance is minimized. The experiments in
[31] also indicate that increasing the number of sample measurements at each reference
point would improve the accuracy, because more data would improve the estimation
for mean and standard deviation. A grid-based Bayesian location-sensing system is
introduced in [30] which investigates an area of interest in their office building to
achieve localization and tracking information with 1.5m accuracy over 50 percent
of the time. Other advanced nonparametric algorithms such as kernel-based one
have been introduced to determine the relationship between the sample RSS and the
location fingerprints in the offline radio map. Several functions can be chosen for the
kernel, with the most common one being the Gaussian kernel [20]. More details about
the Gaussian kernel function can be found below.
2.2 RSS-Position Dependency Models
The key challenge in WLAN positioning is the determination of the dependency
between the RSS and position, ( i.e. relating the RSS radio vector from certain access
points to a spatial position in 2D Cartesian coordinates). This is especially challenging
in indoors due to multipath and shadowing conditions caused by the presence of walls,
people, and other objects, which results in a different received signal strength at each
position indoors that may be only loosely correlated with the inverse of the distance.
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However, the overlapping coverage and the difference of received signal strength from
multiple access points can still be used to describe the position information.
Basically there are two approaches to model the RSS-position dependency: radio
propagation modeling [5, 14, 28] and fingerprint-based modeling [20, 29] .
2.2.1 Radio Propagation Modeling
In the indoor environment, radio propagation modeling approaches [5, 14, 28] cap-
ture the characteristics of signal propagation influenced by reflection, diffraction, and
scattering of radio waves and they use simplified models relating the RSS measure-
ments of the mobile device to the location information. One such model with the
compensation of wall attenuation factor (WAF) can be found in [5]. It includes the
effects of obstacles or walls between the access point (AP) and the mobile device.
The received power can be obtained as:
P (d)[dBm] = P (d0)[dBm]− 10n log( d
d0
)−
nW · nWAF nW < CC ·WAF nW ≥ C (2.1)
where d0 indicates the reference distance, d is the mobile-AP separation distance and
n is a coefficient characterizing the propagation in the environment. For example [16]
in free path loss environment, we have n = 2. In indoor environments, this factor
will be closer to 3. This parameter is rather important, as it may significantly change
the estimation result. The parameter C is the maximum number of wall up to which
the attenuation factor makes a difference and nW is the number of walls between
mobile and AP. In reality, the materials for walls and floors, the layout of rooms, and
the location of objects have a significant effect on the path loss. Such uncertainty
makes it difficult to find an explicit model applicable to general indoor environments.
Also radio propagation modeling requires the exact knowledge of AP’s location for
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trilateration. This makes it impractical in large and ubiquitous deployments of Wi-Fi
network.
2.3 Fingerprinting-Based Methods
Yet another localization technique is introduced as location fingerprinting [5, 19].
It works by constructing a form of radio map to characterize the RSS-position depen-
dency for the area of interest in the offline phase and feeding new RSS measurements
extracted from mobile device in the online phase to estimate the position.
Figure 2.1: Two phases of fingerprinting: offline (training) phase and online (posi-
tioning) phase
A radio map R, as shown in Figure 2.2 , is a set of RSS measurements collected
from different detectable APs at different reference points.
R , {(pi, Fpi)}i=1,2,...,L (2.2)
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where pi contains the coordinates of ith reference point, Fpi , [ ~ri(1), ..., ~ri(n)]′ is
a fingerprint matrix [20], L is the number of reference points and n is the number
of offline phase time samples collected at each reference point. The vector ~ri(t) ,[
r1i (t), ..., r
L
i (t)
]
contains the RSS measurements from L APs at time t at the reference
point i located at the coordinates pi. For instance, there is an area of interest as shown
in Figure 2.2. After law enforcement placed a few reference points outside around
the area, it can collect RSS measurements to form a fingerprint matrix Fpi at each
reference point, like at reference point P1. And at the time stamp t, we will get a
vector ~ri(t). Then during the time period n, we could get a radio map R as the yellow
table shown in the Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: A radio map R collected from three detectable APs at reference point
P1; the yellow table shows the RSS measurements collected at different time stamp
Tn
Note that n RSS samples collected at each reference point contain the information
about the variation of RSS caused by time-varying multipath, shadowing and radio
attenuation factors. However, there are often missing RSS measurements from some
specific APs at some time samples. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4. Also
in the real experiment, the number of detectable APs in the RSS measurements vector
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~ri(t) is determined by the number of APs detected during the following online phase.
And there is a situation where the AP observed during the online phase may not
show up during the offline phase at some reference point. This will be discussed in
Chapter 4.
In the online phase, the mobile devices average RSS measurement vector ~r(k) ,
[ ~¯r1(k), ..., ~¯rL(k)] after a time period k is used to compute position estimation pˆ =
f( ~r(k), R) =
∑L
i=1 piω(
~r(k), Fpi), where
~r(k) is the observed RSS measurement vector
from the criminal device and the weighting function ω(., .) provides the weight asso-
ciated with the reference point, and the function f(., .) provides a mapping between
the online observed RSS measurements and the radio map. In order to determine the
weighting function and the mapping, there are two common and efficient approaches.
2.3.1 K-Nearest Neighbor Technique
The K-nearest neighbor (KNN) technique, which is the simpler of the two tech-
niques we will discuss, was first introduced in [5]. In this approach, the mean value of
the RSS measurements are used instead of the fingerprint matrix. And the distance
between mobile device and the reference point is measured by Euclidean distance,
d2KNN(
~r(k), Fpi) =‖ ~¯r(k)− ~¯ri ‖2 (2.3)
where ~r(k) , [ ~¯r1(k), ..., ~¯rL(k)] is the target’s average RSS measurement vector after
a time period k and ~¯ri =
1
n
∑n
τ=1
~ri(τ) is the average offline RSS measurement at pi.
Then the coordinates of RPs are listed such that d2KNN(
~r(k), Fpi) increases to yield
the sequence {p(1), ..., p(L′)} and the K < L′ RPs are chosen to estimate the position
of mobile device by averaging the coordinates of the K nearest RPs.
pˆ =
1
K
K∑
i=1
p(i) (2.4)
17
2.3.2 Fingerprinting-Based Technique
The second approach considers the minimum mean squared error (MMSE) [23] of
position estimation.
pˆ = argmin
pˆ
E
{
(p− pˆ)T (p− pˆ)} (2.5)
In this case, the MMSE estimate is conditioned on the RSS measurements, so
pˆ = E {p | r} =
∫
pf(p | r)dp (2.6)
The key challenge in this estimation problem is that the posterior density f(p | r)
is unknown and must be estimated from the fingerprint. An ideal method to estimate
posterior density is directly obtained from the fingerprint without the assumption of
any prior statistical forms.
According to Bayes Theorem,
f(p | r) = f(r | p)f(p)∫
f(r | p)f(p)dp (2.7)
The prior density f(p) represents the knowledge of the environment conveyed by
the reference points. Assuming the reference points are uniformly spread throughout
the environment, a simple approximation is
f(p) ≈ 1
L
L∑
i=1
σ (‖ p− pi ‖) (2.8)
Where σ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
Subsituting (2.8) into (2.7), we obtain
f(p | r) ≈ f(r | p)
∑L
i=1 σ (‖ p− pi ‖)∫
f(r | p)∑Li=1 σ (‖ p− pi) dp
=
∑L
i=1 f(r | pi)σ (‖ p− pi ‖)∑L
i=1
∫
f(r | pi)σ (‖ p− pi ‖) dp
=
∑L
i=1 f(r | pi)σ(‖ p− pi ‖)∑L
i=1 f(r | pi)
(2.9)
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Substituting (2.9) into (2.7),
pˆ ≈
∫
p
∑L
i=1 σ(‖ p− pi ‖)∑L
i=1 f(r | pi)
dp
=
∑L
i=1
∫
pf(r | pi)σ(‖ p− pi ‖)dp∑L
i=1 f(r | pi)
=
∑L
i=1 pif(r | pi)∑L
i=1 f(r | pi)
(2.10)
where we define the weight
ωi(r) , f(r | pi) (2.11)
Then, the MMSE estimation problem is reduced to estimating the likelihood den-
sity f(r | pi). Several methods are introduced to estimate the probabilistic weightings
[8, 31], including a histogram-based one and a kernel-based one.
• The histogram-based method mainly relies on the structure present in the data.
From Figure 2.3, we know the histogram based approach is not applicable to the
likelihood estimation problem of this case because RSS distributions at fixed
locations vary in timescale and do not generally follow parametric forms [9] .
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Figure 2.3: The variation of signal strength distribution from different access points
at different reference points: the RSS measurements were collected across the access
point AP1 and AP2 subsequently at reference point RP1 and RP2 for around 2
minutes
• As an alternative, the choice of a kernel-based method in [20] has been shown to
provide more acceptable accuracy in the experiments. This method uses a kernel
density estimator (KDE) to estimate the density: given a set of independent
and identically distributed RSS samples
{
~ri(τ) | τ = 1, ..., n
}
at reference point
pi, the kernel density estimate is given as
f(r | p) ≈ 1
nσ
n∑
τ=1
K(
r − ~ri(τ)
σ
) (2.12)
where K(.) is the kernel, which is a symmetric function that integrates to one.
Often a Gaussian kernel is employed. The σ is a smoothing parameter called the
bandwidth, which controls the region of influence of each offline value. Large
smoothing parameters capture the global structure of the density and when
σ → ∞ the density would be under fitted, whereas small values increase the
detail and when σ → 0 the density would be over fitted. In practice, this
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parameter is determined based on the specific environment. And the τ is used
as the index of time during the offline phase of the system.
Using a Gaussian kernel, the weighting function becomes
ωi(r) ,
1
n
n∑
τ=1
1
(2pi)L/2 |∑ri |1/2 exp(−12(~¯r− ~ri(τ))T
∑
ri
−1(~¯r− ~ri(τ)))) (2.13)
where ~¯r stands for the vetor of the average RSS measurements of the criminal
device,
∑
ri
is the kernel bandwidth matrix and it is defined as
∑
ri
= (σ?ri)
2IL?
whereIL? is L
? × L? identity matrix and σ?ri is the bandwidth of the kernel. In
practice, the choice of the kernel bandwidth parameter is not trivial and is gen-
erally data-dependent. For a Gaussian kernel, the ideal bandwidth minimizing
the asymptotic mean integrated error between the estimated and true density
is given in [20] as
σ?ri = (
4
2L? + 1
)
1
L?+4 σˆrin
−1
4+L? (2.14)
where σˆri =
1
L
∑L?
l=1(σ
l
ri
)2 is the average of the estimates of the marginal vari-
ances.
2.4 Access Points Selection
AP selection in fingerprinting-based location estimation can also be challenging.
Estimation of a position in a two-dimensional space requires measurements from at
least three APs. Due to the wide deployment of APs, the dimension of the measure-
ments is generally greater than the minimum of three which increases the complexity
of the WLAN positioning algorithm. Thus reducing the number of required APs wil
not only improve the speed of positioning but also provide a better power efficiency
and reduce the storage requirement. Also, a set of RSS measurements from detected
AP is a description of the distance between the RP and the AP as well as the topology
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of the environment in terms of the influence of obstacles and human activities. There-
fore, subsets of the detected APs may report correlated and duplicated measurements.
Clearly we want to select the APs with lowest correlation. These motivate the need
for AP selection in the preprocessing step. Youssef et al. [31] used a joint clustering
technique to reduce the computational requirements by clustering APs from which
the receiver gets the strongest signal. Kushiki et al. [20] and Chen et al. [9] selected
the most discriminative APs, defined as the ones that make most of the contribution
to distinguish the places where the measurements be collected, and minimized the
correlation between the detected APs in order to reduce the redundancy and max-
imize information gained from the APs. The method of AP selection used in this
thesis is multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) with the goal of finding the optimum
projection that can separate the RSS pattern among different locations [13, 15].
The MDA is the generalization of Fishers linear discriminant [13], which is used
to transform the data that are best represented in the least squared sense [26]. The
MDA is used when there are more than two classes. In our case, the classes can be
regarded as the different reference locations and the objective of MDA is to find the
collection of APs with enough entries that are useful to discriminate between the RSS
at different locations.
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Figure 2.4: MDA based AP selection [15]. Two data sets respectively collected at
location 1 and location 2 where there are two access points, AP1 and AP2.
A simple example is provided in Figure 2.4. The plot represents two different
distributions of RSS measurements from two different APs at different two locations.
If we want to decrease the dimensions, a generic AP selection method might just
provide either the x axis oriented selection or the y axis oriented one. For both of
these options, the original distribution would overlap on either the x axis or the y
axis. But the two sets of data could be clearly classified while projecting original
RSS measurements onto the line determined by MDA. Assuming ~r represents the
original RSS data, the discriminant components (DCs) should be extracted via the
MDA projection matrix A as follows,
Y = AT~r (2.15)
where Y = [y1, ..., yD] is the projected data, A ∈ RL′×D represents the MDA projec-
tion matrix, D refers to the number of DC chosen and ~r ∈ RL′ represents a measured
RSS vector among L′ APs.
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In MDA, there are two scatter matrices called “between-class” (SB) and “within-
class” (SW ) matrices.
SW =
L∑
r=1
∑
X∈l
(X − µr)(X − µ)T (2.16)
SB =
L∑
r=1
nr(µr − µ¯)(µr − µ¯)T (2.17)
where X stands for the RSS measurements collected during a period of time l,
µr =
1
nr
∑
X∈lX this mean is the average of RSS from L
? APs at the rth loca-
tion, µ¯ = 1
L?
∑L?
r=1 µr is the global mean, and nr is the number of samples at the
rth reference location. As defined in [26] , SW measures the closeness of the samples
within the locations, while SB measures the separations between locations. In order
to maximize the between-class measure and minimize the within-class measure, one
way to maximize the ratio [13] :
AˆMDA = argmin
A
∣∣ATSBA∣∣
|ATSWA| ⇒ (SB − λiSW )A
?
i = 0 (2.18)
where A?i , the columns of ˆAMDA, are the generalized eigenvectors of S
−1
W SB corre-
sponding to the eigenvalues λi, which are ranked in decreasing order [15]. As a result,
a satisfying matrix A would lead to DCs that have high spatial separation and low
temporal variation.
A proper value of D, the number of DCs, could provide a graceful balance between
accuracy and complexity. Actually we could decide the number of DCs by calculating
the cumulative percentage of eigenvalues obtained in MDA as follows:
∑D
i=1 λi∑L?
l=1
≥ η (2.19)
where the eigenvalues {λ1, ..., λL?} are obtained from 2.18. Each λi represents the
contribution of each yi in the projected space. The greater value of λi is, the more
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information that yi would contain. Then we set threshold λ that would represent
the most percentage of contribution that the determined DCs contain, and in the
experiment it is set to be 0.92 . Once the projection A is determined, both online
measurements ~r and F (pi) should be adapted to the same space, which are denoted
as ~¯y and M(pi). So 2.13 turns out to be:
ω?i (r) ,
1
n
n∑
τ=1
1
(2pi)L/2
∣∣Σr?i ∣∣1/2 exp(−
1
2
(~¯y − ~r?i (τ))TΣ−1r?i (~¯y − ~r?i (τ))) (2.20)
2.5 Chapter Summery
This chapter gives a brief overview of wireless-based location systems serving for
LBS. It also discusses two kinds of RSS-position dependency models that are used to
describe the relationship between the received signal strength and coordinate position.
Two fingerprinting methods, KNN and Gaussian kernel-based probabilistic techniques
are described in details, as they are implemented in later experiments. Finally, MDA-
based access point selection for improving estimation performance and reducing the
computing complexity is discussed. This technique is used by the proposed positioning
system for post hoc indoor localization.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENTAL DEPLOYMENT AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter, in order to evaluate our fingerprinting-based method on the post
hoc indoor localization problem, we set up an environment to test the procedure of
determining the crime mobile device’s location at the time of crime as described in
Section 1.3. We select a residential area where four apartment buildings are adjacent
to each other. Each building has three floors and contains nine apartments (3.1),
making 36 apartments in total. In the experiments, two rooms in one family’s apart-
ment are selected as the area of interest with the goal of determing in which room
the mobile device was located at the time of crime. Twelve testing “crime position”
have been set in the two rooms as ground truth, which will be used to calculate the
error distance in the estimated position.
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Figure 3.1: Residential Environment ( 26 Brittany Manor Dr, Amherst, MA 01002)
Imagine that a cyber-crime has been committed in the area of interest, and law
enforcement investigates. The experimental procedure to validate the investigative
process described in Chapter 1 will proceed, as follows:
• Collect a vector of RSS measurements for each potential “crime position” in the
area of interest, either in room A or room B. Each vector dataset is regarded
as the one that law enforcement could extract either directly from the mobile
device itself after the time of crime or from nearby access points.
• Set reference points around the area of interest; for each, collect a vector of
RSS measurements to form the fingerprinting radio map post hoc. This step
is to simulate the step that the law enforcement would take to collect data to
determine the device location.
• For each reference point, apply the methods of Chapter 2 to calculate the weight
that is used to describe the closeness between the RSS vector corresponding to
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the reference point and the criminal device. If the value of the weight is high,
it means that the target was close to the reference point.
• Sum up the weighted coordinates of each reference point to get the targets
estimated location.
Per Section 1.3, we assume that the device used to collect the RSS measurements
is located with the same altitude as all the APs are and that all of the detectable
APs are the same in terms of hardware. We also only consider stationary wireless
devices in our work, which means that all of the data is collected while the device was
not in motion. Finally, the impact of the experimenter’s human body on the signal
attenuation while conducting the experiment is ignored.
3.1 General Setup
3.1.1 The Buildings
The experimental data sets used in this thesis are collected from an apartment
complex in the southern part of Amherst where there are four buildings (e.g. Apt
121, Apt 119, Apt 115 and Apt 117) located closely to each other as shown in Figure
3.1. Each of the four buildings has nine families in total with an average of 3 people
per family. In contrast to many evaluations in the existing literature, however, this
thesis does not use an artificially constructed setup. Instead, the existing WLAN
communication infrastructure in this area is utilized. Up to 85 access points can be
observed in the experimental area and 28 of them can be detected in all four buildings.
Hence, there is a sufficient number of access points in the experimental area.
Each family’s apartment is around 750 square feet and has the room layout il-
lustrated in Figure 3.2. Recalling that a key goal is to determine the room in which
the device was located at the time of the crime, two bedrooms are selected in one
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apartment and marked as A and B-referring to possible criminal scenes (as shown in
Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.2: The apartment layout of the region of interest
3.1.2 Measurement Apparatus
RSS measurements used in this thesis were collected using a Dell Inspiron 1545
laptop with a Pentium processor, an external TP-Link TL-WN722N network adapter,
an external portable GPS, and the Windows 7 operating system. RSS readings were
obtained through publicly available wardriving software, Kismet-2011-03-R2 [3].
Kismet passively scans 802.11 channels, captures the wireless frames from the
local interface (the TP-Link adapter in this case), which supports monitoring mode,
measures the received signal strength, and reports GPS coordinates when integrated
with a GPS device. It generates several log files including a .gpsxml which contains
all of the information required. The RSS measurement is reported as integers in the
range of (-100, 0) in unit of decibels relative to 1 milliwatt (dBm).
A sample set of measurements in Kismets .gpsxml output format are shown in
Figure 3.3. This file includes the information about the detected access point’s MAC
address, the timestamp when capturing the measurement, the coordinate location of
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the access point, the speed of the device’s movement and the received signal strength.
When conducting the experiment, there are around 5000 samples from different ob-
servable access points within two minutes in one output.
3.1.3 Testing/reference Point Placement
This thesis studies the stationary user scenario: we regard the position of the crim-
inal mobile device as fixed during the commission of the crime and, naturally, assume
that law enforcement would stand still to collect the reference point measurements.
Figure 3.3: A screenshot of .gpsxml, one of Kismet’s output log files
A test point for a given trial corresponds to the spot where the criminal mobile
device was used. Since these are inside the building we fail to record their location by
the mounted GPS. Instead, the testing points for different trials are chosen to lie on a
uniform grid, with each marked as “T” in Figure 3.4. Thus it is easy for us to associate
a location with each test point in the building so as to establish the “ground truth”
against which our measurement algorithm will be measured. As shown in Figure 3.4,
six different testing points were placed in each room, with a distance between the two
closest points of 1.5 meters.
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The collection of reference points (RPs) used on each trial are also chosen from
a uniform gird and are shown as ’R’ in Figure 3.2. The distance between the two
closest RPs is 3 meters.
Table 3.1: The Latitude/Longitude Coordinates of Each Testing Point
Testing Point Latitude Longitude Testing Point Latitude Longitude
TP 1 42.3477222 -72.5289444 TP 2 42.3477360 -72.5289444
TP 3 42.3477460 -72.5289444 TP 4 42.3477222 -72.5289167
TP 5 42.3477360 -72.5289167 TP 6 42.3477460 -72.5289167
TP 7 42.3477222 -72.5288889 TP 8 42.3477360 -72.5288889
TP 9 42.3477460 -72.5288889 TP 10 42.3477222 -72.5288611
TP 11 42.3477360 -72.5288611 TP 12 42.3477460 -72.5288611
Table 3.2: The Latitude/Longitude Coordinates of Each Reference Point
Reference Point Latitude Longitude Reference Point Latitude Longitude
RP 1 42.3476389 -72.5289722 RP 11 42.3477778 -72.5288333
RP 2 42.3476667 -72.5289722 RP 12 42.3477778 -72.5288056
RP 3 42.3476944 -72.5289722 RP 13 42.3477778 -72.5287778
RP 4 42.3477222 -72.5289722 RP 14 42.3477778 -72.52875
RP 5 42.34775 -72.5289722 RP 15 42.3477778 -72.5287222
RP 6 42.3477778 -72.5289722 RP 16 42.34775 -72.5287222
RP 7 42.3477778 -72.5289444 RP 17 42.3477222 -72.5287222
RP 8 42.3477778 -72.5289167 RP 18 42.3476944 -72.5287222
RP 9 42.3477778 -72.5288889 RP 19 42.3476667 -72.5287222
RP 10 42.3477778 -72.5288611 RP 20 42.3476389 -72.5287222
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Figure 3.4: Experimental area: ’R’ points represent RPs, ’T’ points represent TPs.
3.2 Data Sets
3.2.1 Preprocessing
Before validating and comparing the fingerprinting-based algorithms based on the
collected data, we need to consider how to convert the data into useful matrices,
including translating the .gpsxml file into a MATLAB readable file, selecting the
number of useful access points, and handling missing or multiple data at certain
timestamp.
Per Section 3.1.2, the raw log file of the Kismets output is not human readable
and not applicable to analysis and calculation. So the raw log is processed to produce
a .txt file that just contain the BSSID (basic service set indentification), timestamp,
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latitude, longitude and the received signal strength. Such a file is then easy for
MATLAB to convert into a matrix.
A great challenge is processing the set of noisy and unreliable measurements to
produce the proper set of pre-processed input for the algorithm.
For a particular AP, the received signal strength generally decreases as the dis-
tance to the AP increases. Thus, the RSS measurements collected at the testing
points for nearby APs can offer more data sets used to describe the environment than
measurements collected from more distant points; hence, these nearby will provide
will provide fewer outages during measurement and hence provide greater utility.
Therefore, we filter the raw data by a certain percentage of RSS availability. This
percentage of availability should be balanced according to the fact that a high per-
centage would result in fewer sets of measurements, and a low percentage would result
in high redundancy. Both of the situations would negatively impact the estimation
result. The useful set of RSS measurements in this experiment is set to the availabil-
ity of RSS that has at least 65 percent of the possible time samples. Also, we found
that sometimes there are more than one measurement at the same timestamp from
the same AP, and we consider these should be individually added up when calculating
the availability of RSS.
We need also to deal with the situation where there are some missing RSS mea-
surements from spefic APs. As defined in Chapter 2, a fingerprint matrix is Fpi ,[
~ri(1), ..., ~ri(n)
]′
, where pi stands for ith reference point, n is the number of times-
tamps recorded at the reference point, and ~ri(t) ,
[
r1i (t), r
2
i (t), ..., r
L?
i (t)
]
contains
the RSS measurements from L? APs at time t at the reference point pi.
In the experiment, L? is the cardinality of the set of APs observed at the crime
mobile device’s point of view. Thus, for the fingerprint matrix collected at the refer-
ence point, sometimes there are missing RSS measurements at time t from the specific
AP l?. It seems reasonable to set the missing data to be -99 dBm since the AP is
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not detectable. But in order to avoid singularities while estimating the location, we
set the missing one to be (-100+2*rand) dBm instead. And the rand represents the
uniformly distributed pseudorandom numbers with a range of [0, 1]. Moreover, there
are some timestamps when there are multiple RSS measurements collected from the
same access point. In this case, we set the RSS value in the data to be processed to
the average value of the measurements collected from the access point.
3.2.2 Data Collection
After processing the raw measurements, we obtain empirical estimates at different
times from which we need to build the RSS value database Fpi , i = 1, 2, .. at position
pi. A sample set of data for a given Fpi is shown in Table 3.1 for a given TP or RP.
Table 3.3: WLAN RSS Sample Database Profile
Timestamps AP 1 [dBm] AP 2 [dBm] AP 3 [dBm] AP 4 [dBm] ...
1 -98.69 -71 -78 -78 ...
2 -98.69 -76.5 -77 -78 ...
3 -98.69 -74.3 -78 -91.52 ...
4 -98.69 -70 -65.5 -98.69 ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
t -66 -62.3 -79 -78 ...
For the RSS data collected at a testing point, we build a 1 by L? vector that
contains the mean RSS value for each of the L? detected access points. Associated
with the coordinates of each reference point (partly shown in Table 3.2), a radio map
R , {(pi, Fpi)}L
?
i=1 is constructed.
Next, after pre-selecting access points and filtering with MDA (see Chapter 2),
Table 3.3 shows the MAC addresses of the 5 APs that are most useful in estimating
the location.
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Table 3.4: AP MAC Adress List
AP NO. MAC Adress
AP 1 F4:6D:04:8C:0C:38
AP 2 E0:91:F5:AF:78:F0
AP 3 C8:3A:35:3C:63:B8
AP 4 C4:3D:C7:8D:A6:7A
AP 5 C0:C1:C0:35:07:5D
3.3 Figure of Merit
In order to calculate the error, Haversine formula [2, 22] is used to calculate the
distance between two latitude/longitude points. For two points on a sphere with
lattitudes and longitudes, the distance between the two points is a spherical distance
where the Haversine formula has been applied on .
3.4 Choose Experiment Parameters
3.4.1 The number of neighbors in KNN
As described in Section 2.3.1, KNN (K-Nearest Neighbor) will be used as a base-
line for comparison with the more sophisticated fingerprinting algorithms. It is a
deterministic approach that uses the average value of the RSS measurements from
the radio map to estimate the criminal mobile device’s position.
In order to find the proper value of K for the best performance of the KNN
algorithm in this experiment, we pick four testing points (see Table 3.5) and estimate
their location individually with the same radio map built from the measurements
collected at all the reference points. For each testing point, we set the K to be from
3 to 20 with step of 1 and then get the average error distance depending on different
values of K.
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Figure 3.5 illustrates the effect of K on the average error distance. It shows
that the average error distance can vary over a range of 7 meters if K is not chosen
carefully, which is significant while locating a mobile device in the indoor environment
for our forensics application. The performance improves as K increases to about
10. However, K should obviously not be set to a high value: this would imply
that the algorithm takes so many reference points into account that the estimated
location would lean to be the center of the area because the reference points are placed
around the area of interest (and recall that the KNN algorithm does no weighting
of the locations employed). So K is set to the optimal value of 10 for the following
comparison of different algorithms.
Table 3.5: The Testing Points Used for Finding the Proper K in K-Nearest Neighbor
Testing Point Latitude Longitude Testing Point Latitude Longitude
TP 1 42.3477222 -72.5289444 TP 2 42.3477360 -72.5289444
TP 3 42.3477460 -72.5289444 TP 4 42.3477222 -72.5289167
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Figure 3.5: To Find the Proper K in KNN: the average error distance for different
choices of K and K = 3,4,...,20
3.4.2 Kernel Width σ?ri
For the more sophisticated algorithm of Chapter 2 employing the Gaussian kernel,
the bandwidth, also known as the window width, determines the width of the kernel
or the region of influence of each reference RSS fingerprint matrix. A large window
width captures the global structure of the density of the fingerprint matrix while a
smaller one reveals more details. As σ?ri → 0, the density estimate approaches the set
of data centered at the set with a significant over-fitting. As σ?ri → ∞, the density
estimate approaches a uniform density with an under-fitting.
In pratice, the choice of the kernel bandwidth parameter is generally data-dependent,
defined as σ?ri in (2.14) according to [20] . In order to determine a proper width for
our experimental environment, σ?ri is replaced by α × σ?ri , and α in the interval [1,3]
(with a step of 0.2) were considered.
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Five sets of fingerprint matrices collected at the testing points (Table 3.6) have
been used. Figure 3.6 illustrates error distance as a function of the kernel width for
the testing data. Both too large kernel width and too small kernel width can impact
the performance on estimation by inducing under-fitting or over-fitting of the original
data. In practice, the experimenter can collect validation data first and then choose
a proper kernel bandwidth for further use. In our case, the α is set to be 1.9.
Table 3.6: The Testing Points Used for Finding the Proper bandwidth for the Gaus-
sian kernel
Testing Point Latitude Longitude Testing Point Latitude Longitude
TP 2 42.3477360 -72.5289444 TP 1 42.3477222 -72.5289444
TP 3 42.3477460 -72.5289444 TP 4 42.3477222 -72.5289167
TP 7 42.3476944 -72.5288889
Figure 3.6: The influence of different Gaussian kernel bandwidth on error distance
3.4.3 MDA threshold η
Another parameter that is required to be determined experimentally is the MDA
threshold η defined in (2.20), as it determines how many and which APs should be
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used as the discriminant components (DCs) to carry enough information about the
RSS environment. Therefore, the number of DCs is intelligently determined based
on the characteristics of the RSS environment. In the experiment, we use three test
points to consider the performance for different thresholds. The figure shows that the
larger value of η is the larger error distance would be. And when the η is equal to
one, the number of DC would be the number of detectable access points, in which
case all the detectable access points would be used (which then, of course, negates
the purpose of using MDA to refine the estimated result). So the threshold is set to
be 92% for further use.
Figure 3.7: The MDA threshold η’s influence on the performance: when η is .92 the
error distance is minimized with around 1 meter and the variance around that value
is flat and stable
3.5 Signal Propagation Analysis
The IEEE 802.11b/g/n WLAN standard uses radio frequencies in the 2.4 GHz
band, which is license-free in most places around the world. However, it suffers from
inherent disadvantages, such as the interference from microwave ovens, Bluetooth
devices and other devices. Moreover, the indoor environment has unique properties
that influence the radio signals used by the positioning systems and make the signal
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propagation complicated. In particular, it may be weaken or obstructed by walls and
human bodies and reach the receiver through multipath due to reflection, refraction,
scattering and absorption of radio waves by inside structures. These prominent factors
also cause the signal strength to vary over time. In addition [20] shows that the
movement of human beings and other uncontrollable factors such as temperature
and air movement create random effects of radio propagation inside the building. So
positioning based on received signal strength patterns is difficult.
Figure 3.8: Examples of RSS distributions for the same AP over two minutes at the
same location at 8:20 am, 4:44 am and 7:37 pm (from left to right)
Figure 3.8 shows the variation of the receive signal strength collected at different
times. The samples for the histograms are produced by averaging approximately
2 minutes of RSS measurements collected from the same access point at the same
location inside the building. As can be seen, the noisy signal can be as weak as -80dBm
or as strong as -10dBm. From the receiver’s point of view, such 70-dB range implies
that there is a noisy environment indoors and the shape of the distribution is not
predictable; that is, we cannot find a traditional distribution to describe it. Therefore,
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the dynamic and unpredictable propagation characteristic of RSS in indoors means
that an explicit formulation of the RSS-position relationship is impossible.
3.6 Compensation of Wall Attenuation
As shown in Figure 3.8, RSS measurements present quite unpredictable variation
in the indoor environment. As described in Section 2.2.1, radio propagation models
applied in the indoor environment can take into account the additional attenuation
cased by walls. This motivates us to improve the estimation by taking into account the
significant path loss caused by walls in indoor radio propagation. In the experiment,
the wall attenuation factor (WAF) is used to adjust the signal measurements collected
at the testing point, with the purpose of approximately compensating the signal
strength loss caused by the exterior wall around the area of interest and thus aiming
to improve the estimated results.
3.6.1 Calculate the WAF
We found the wall attenuation factor (WAF) [5, 25] by finding the average signal
strength difference between the outside and the inside separated by the wall(s). In
reality, the law enforcement could find a similar apartment with the same building
infrastructure and measure the WAF. In our experiment, the average value of the
difference is roughly 10 dB.
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Figure 3.9: Method to calculate the WAF in an apartment
3.6.2 Pre-determine the Position of the Target and Modify the RSS mea-
surements
For the criminal mobile device’s viewpoint, the impact of the wall attenuation is
different once the mobile device is located in a different room, because there may be
different number of walls on the path of the radio propagation from the same access
point. For example, there are two rooms illustrated in Figure 3.10. And the number of
walls on the path of the radio propagation from the same AP1 to the criminal mobile
device in Room B is one while the number in Room A is two. So the impact of the
RSS attenuation at Room B would be less than the one in Room A from the same
access point, AP1. Thus there would be different values of the WAF compensated
in the two cases. However, there is no way for law enforcement to determine which
room the criminal mobile device was in after the crime, and, in particular, this is one
of the key goals of this work. So in order to make a correct compensation on the
collected RSS measurements, it is necessary to pre-determine which room the target
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has more probability to be in so that we can determine the number of walls between
the outside and the inside.
The Mahalanobis distance has been used in this case to pre-determine the po-
sition. The Mahalanobis distance is defined as DM = (~r − ~¯F )TC−1(~r − ~¯F ), where
~r represents the mean of the targets RSS data, ~¯F represents the mean of the radio
fingerprint collected at specific area, and C represents the covariance matrix of data
in ~F . According to its definition, we know that the Mahalanobis distance considers
the probabilistic characteristic of the fingerprint map, such as its variation.
Figure 3.10: Pre-determine the position of the target
In reality, we may not get into the area of interest to collect the RSS measurements
to describe each room’s signal environment. So in the experiment, we choose a set
of measurements collected close to but outside the room as the room’s sample RSS
measurements. Since it is a probabilistic way to estimate the position of the criminal
device, there is a case where the values of the two distances are similar and we
can not pre-determine the position of the criminal device based on a small amount of
difference in probability. So we need to balance the two probabilities that the criminal
device was in each of the two rooms. To do this, we define the admittedly ad hoc
WAF coefficient as ω = −(DMB − DMA)/(DMB + DMA), where DMB (DMA) is the
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Mahalanobis distance between the target and Room B (RoomA) and it is bigger than
zero. This coefficient has following characteristics: (i) its absolute value is always less
than one; (2) its absolute value is proportional to the probability that the criminal
mobile device was in one of the rooms versus the other one.
For example, if the target happened to be in Room A, ω<0. Then the set of
RSS value from AP2 should be modified by w ∗ WAF and the set of data from
AP1 and AP3 should be modified by w ∗WAF ∗ 2 (there are two walls on the path
of propagation). Otherwise, ω >0, and the data from AP2 should be modified by
+w ∗WAF ∗ 2 and the set from AP1 and AP3 should be modified by +w ∗WAF .
To simplify the WAF compensation, we group the detectable access points in the
neighborhood based on their locations into five groups, namely G115, G117, G119, G121L
and G121R (as shown in Figure 3.11). And we regard each group of access points as
one and consider its relative location to the area of interest to find the number of
walls in between the AP group and the suspect room.
After compensating for the effects of the walls and creating the “correct” data
collected at the testing points, we will apply the fingerprinting-based technique on
the modified data to estimate the position.
Figure 3.11: The groups of the detectable access points in the neigborhood
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3.7 Performance Comparison
Throughout the above experiments, a set of optimal parameters that gives the
best performance of KNN and Gaussian kernel-based techniques can be determined
and is given in Table 3.4. The performance of the Gaussian kernel-based technique is
then compared to the KNN technique in terms of the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the position error.
Table 3.7: A set of optimal parameters for the Gaussian kernel-based technique ap-
plied
Number of APs pre-selected by RSS apperance 21
Number of discrimnant components 5
Kernel Width 1.9*σ?ri
MDA threshold η 92%
The position errors of the four methods are compared in Figure 3.12 and Figure
3.13. In the experiments, there are 12 testing points involved in the comparison of the
accuracy of the KNN algorithm and the Gaussian kernel-based algorithm. Clearly,
the performance of the Gaussian kernel-based positioning algorithm outperforms the
KNN algorithm; it improves significantly in terms of mean error (53%), maximum
error (38%) and variance (66%). And according to Table 3.5 and Figure 3.13, the
compensation of WAF slightly improves the performance of Kernel-based technique by
decreasing the maximun error and the variance. Table 3.5 summarizes the statistics
of the position errors of the algorithms.
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Table 3.8: A set of optimal parameters for the Gaussian kernel-based technique ap-
plied
Method Mean [m] Max [m] Variance [m2]
KNN 2.99 5.36 2.53
MDA-projected Kernel method with noWAF 1.40 3.33 0.86
MDA-projected Kernel method with WAF=15 1.46 2.53 0.61
MDA-projected Kernel method with WAF=10 1.36 2.78 0.54
Figure 3.12: The comparison of performance between KNN and MDA-projected
Kernel method
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Figure 3.13: The comparison of performance between Kernel method with noWAF
and the one with WAF compensation
3.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter documents experiments for determining the location of a crime mo-
bile device to an accuracy which can distinguish between two adjacent rooms. In par-
ticular, the performances of two positioning algorithms - KNN and Gaussian kernel-
based - are studied in the post hoc forensics scenario. In addition, the effect of the
compensation of WAF in indoor environments has been considered. The experiments
were carried out on the second floor of an apartment complex in the southern part of
Amherst, MA.
The analysis of the noisy characteristics of the signal environment in indoors im-
plies that the traditional signal propagation model is not sufficient to indicate the
subtle dependency of the RSS measurements on the position. We next experimen-
tally determine the optimal parameters used in the experiment to compare the two
algorithms. As expected, the MDA threshold shows the trade-off of the number of
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access points used in the Gaussian kernel-based approach, whereas the selection of K
in KNN indicates the impact of the number of reference points on the performance
of indoor positioning. Our comparison of the two positioning techniques shows that
the Gaussian kernel-based positioning technique outperforms the KNN technique in
terms of cumulative error distributions. We also observed a slight improvement of
the performance due to the compensation of WAF.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Modern cybercrimes leave behind digital evidence; hence, the ability to identify a
perpetrator from such evidence - digital forensics - is of importance. In this thesis,
we have studied the post hoc fingerprint-based indoor positioning problem. Using the
motivating example of obtaining a search warrant, we consider determining the loca-
tion of a criminal mobile device at the time of the crime with fine enough granularity
to distinguish between two adjacent rooms. Our main contribution is an experimen-
tal evaluation of fingerprint-based methods in a residential area. Meanwhile, we also
consider introducing a new factor due to wall attenuation and consider the effect of its
incorporation on positioning the mobile device. While empirical performance studies
of instantaneous indoor positioning systems based on fingerprinting have been widely
presented in the literature, this study is the first to consider post hoc indoor prosi-
tioning problem from the forensics; in particular, the ability to determine the room
in which a crime was committed using only the RF fingerprint of the device at the
time of the cirme and RF fingerprints gathered from test points outside the building
is the main contribution.
Unlike instantaneous geographical localization, which: (1) tries to locate the tar-
get while the target is in the area of interest, and (2) exploits a received signal strength
(RSS) fingerprint matrixes at each of the reference points (RPs) taken a priori within
the building of interest, our study considers placing reference points around the build-
ing of interest, where the target used to be. As in indoor instantaneous localization
work, the RSS fingerprint matrixes are used to build a radio map, and, after the
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radio map is done, an RSS-position dependency model is employed to map the vector
fingerprint of RSS measurements of the criminal device to an estimated location. In
this thesis, we have explored two RSS-position dependency models: the K-Nearest
Neighbor (KNN) model and a Gaussian Kernel-based one.
In order to evaluate the performance of these two RSS-position dependency models
in the post hoc indoor positioning problem, we set up an experiment to test the
procedure of determining the crime mobile device’s location at the time of crime. We
selected a residential area where four apartment buildings are adjacent to each other
and there are a large number of detectable access points. To simplify the experiment,
we picked two adjacent bedrooms in one apartment as the area of interest. In each
room, there were six testing points used to represent hypothesized crime mobile device
locations in the room. The radio map was built for 20 reference points placed outside
the apartment.
In our experiments, we found the indoor environment is very noisy, with around
70 dB of dynamic range and the shape of the received signal’s distribution was not
predictable enought to find a traditional distribution to describe it. Hence, the KNN
model and a MDA-projected Gaussian kernel model are introduced and compared.
We found better results from the kernel model, which demonstrated a mean error
distance of 1.4 meters, which is precise enough to location the mobile device to a
given room with sufficient certainty to establish the probable cause required to obtain
a search warrant. Finally, we ameasured the wall attenuation factor (WAF) at roughly
10 dB per wall in our experiment. Since walls significantly impact the signal strength
in indoor environments, we used the WAF to compensante the RSS measurements
collected at the testing point with the goal of improving the estimation result. The
experiment results showed that our current WAF compensation only slightly improves
the performance of the MDA-projected Gaussian kernel model
50
4.1 Future Work
During the experiment, we found that the some reference points selected were far
enough from the area of interest that the fingerprint data collected at such RPs did not
aid in describing the RSS environment in the area of interest, thus adding unnecessary
computation and an extra amount of RSS measurements. Therefore, a key feature of
the post hoc indoor localization problem is the adaptive placement of reference points
as data is collected and the area of interest gets smaller. It seems reasonable that one
could use the current measurement information to guide the placement of successive
reference points so as maximize the discrimination in answering a question of inter-
est: for example, the apartment from which a wireless cybercrime was committed.
As an example, consider our experiment. At the beginning we might hvae no idea
about which apartment building the criminal device was located at the time of the
crimbe, but instead might but just know it was in the four-building residential area.
After some estimation, it would be easy to figure out in which building the crime
was committed, which would then guide reference point placement to points around
that building. This topic, which is one of the distinctive advantages for the investiga-
tor in the post hoc indoor localization problem versus standard instantaneous indoor
positioning for location-based services (LBS), is of high interest for further study.
A second avenue for future research is the improvement of the algorithm to com-
pensate the wall attenuation factor (WAF) on the crime mobile devices fingerprint
database. The current way to compensate the WAF is based on the presumption of
the mobile device’s position. However, in the experiment, it worked especially poorly
when the distance of the two positions to be distinguised were small. In that case, the
WAF coefficient was so small as to result in little WAF compensation adjustment to
the fingerprint vector. Another limited factor is that we assumed that there was only
one floor in that area; that is, we ignored the significant impact of floor attenuation
on the RSS measurements. Hence, we believe that there is potential for methods
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which exploit detailed blueprints of buildings to perform detailed three dimensional
attenuation compensation in the collection of RF fingerprints.
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